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 The Great Pacific War: A
 History of the American-
 Japanese Campaign of 1931 -
 33 by Hector C. Bywater,
 New York, St. Martins Press,
 1 99 1 , originally published
 1925, and The Riddle of the
 Sands: A Record of Secret
 Service Recently Achieved by
 Eskine Childers, Annapolis,
 MD, Naval Institute Press,
 1 99 1 , originally published
 1903.
 A central question of analysis is
 the accuracy of forecasts, whether
 one is dealing with economics,
 weather or war. Properly framed,
 the question is one of utilitarian
 accuracy, for precision is always
 elusive. Consider Admiral Chester
 Nimitz' famous retrospective about
 war gaming in a lecture delivered at
 the Naval War College in 1960:
 "The war with Japan had been
 reenacted in the game room
 here by so many people that
 nothing that happened during
 the war was a surprise -
 absolutely nothing except the
 Kamikaze tactics toward the
 end of the war. "
 His words must either be taken
 as hyperbole or a general statement
 about the broad outline of the Pacific
 campaign. One may cite the surprise
 attack on Pearl Harbor and its conse-
 quences, the Solomons and New
 Guinea campaigns in their entirety,
 and the prominence of naval aviation
 as three among many departures
 from any and all of the scores of war
 games played in Newport from 1919
 to 1939. From a CINCPOA
 perspective, Nimitz was not
 interested in such "details." The
 lessons of which he spoke had to do
 with the indefensibility of the Philip-
 pines and the enormous
 consequences, some of which are
 taken up below. A splendid, concise
 account of the influence of war
 gaming at the Naval War College
 between World Wars I and II may be
 found in Michael Vlahos' article
 "Wargaming, an Enforcer of
 Strategic Realism, 1919 to 1942,"
 Naval War College Review ,
 March/ April 1986. The recent and
 detailed account of the planning ~
 and gaming - for war with Japan is
 Miller's War Plan Orangey it simply
 reinforces Vlahos.
 So much for the value of naval
 war gaming by the professionals:
 American naval officers were
 concerned with war plans. The
 gaming tool was imprecise - a blunt
 instrument the value of which was in
 any strict sense indefinable and
 almost invisible - but it was accurate
 enough to be of the highest utility to
 Nimitz in conducting the Pacific
 campaign.
 Books on imaginary wars are the
 amateurs' equivalent of strategic war
 gaming. There has been a recent
 splash of them, including Tom Clan-
 cy's thought-provoking book, Red
 Storm Rising , about a scenario that
 now happily seems outdated. Most
 have been of the Sci-fi variety, H.G.
 Wells' The War of the Worlds being
 the prototype along with Orson
 Wells' 1938 radio adaptation of it.
 At least two old classics were serious
 efforts and each in its own way was
 taken seriously. The Riddle of the
 Sands , written in 1903 by Erskin
 Childers and recently republished by
 the Naval Institute Press in its
 Classics of Naval Literature series,
 forecasts a surprise invasion of the
 east coast of England by the Kaiser's
 army. Barges in great numbers are
 discovered secreted in canals by two
 inquisitive Englishmen sailing among
 the shallows, shoals and islands of
 the Frisian coast. There is no
 invasion, however, and in fact the
 book is a self-fulfilling prophesy,
 because Our Heroes escape the
 clutches of the dastardly Imperial
 Navy and sail home to warn their
 countrymen. No surprises; no
 attack. Childers was in earnest about
 the threat and the book caused
 something of a public sensation in
 Britain. The case can be made that
 the British army was beefed up as a
 result. The Riddle of the Sands is a
 splendid read and still something of
 a cult-favorite among Oxford, Cam-
 bridge, and St. Andrews University
 students.
 Not for impact but for fearless
 and detailed description of a whole
 war from beginning to end, Hector
 C. Bywater's The Great Pacific War
 is in a class by itself. It is the finest
 example I know of an attempt to
 describe a war between two naval
 powers as it could be expected to
 unfold. Evidently one of Bywater's
 aims was to discourage the Japanese
 from starting a war with the United
 States. In this instance the author
 failed. Recently republished by St.
 Martin's Press and timed to coincide
 with the beginning of The Real
 Thing, it is well worth an
 introspective reading by anyone
 interested in analysis and forecasting.
 It is only slight exaggeration all of
 the best lessons it took the gamers
 the better part of 30 years to deduce
 at the Naval War College.
 For starters, Bywater predicts a
 Japanese surprise attack before the
 declaration of war - on the Panama
 Canal, thus eliminating the entire
 Atlantic Fleet for the first two
 months of hostilities. The Japanese
 seize the Philippines (landing at
 Lingayen Gulf) and Guam at once,
 crushing the American Asiatic Fleet
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 in the process. The US Pacific fleet,
 isolated by the closing of the Panama
 ^ Canal and without the cruising radius
 ^ or logistics ships (the train) to move
 westward until advance bases are
 taken, must fume in frustration. And
 the war proceeds, as Marine and
 Army units and transports to cany
 them are built up at Pearl Harbor
 concurrent with distracting Japanese
 attacks at Dutch Harbor and against
 our West Coast. Both sides attempt
 ambushes and both suffer from lack
 of scouting. Already search aircraft
 are a great resource in short supply.
 In a temporizing move reminiscent of
 Guadalcanal operations, the US Navy
 blocks a Japanese thrust to take
 American Samoa. The Japanese
 have invaded China and are getting
 bogged down in its vastness.
 The American fleet, now built
 up, begins its majestic march through
 the central Pacific, seizing Truk
 which is not yet in Bywater's war of
 1931-32 the bastion it will become in
 1943-44. The climactic fleet action
 is in the vicinity of Yap, a sort of
 A 1932 compression of two great
 naval battles of 1944, off the
 Marianas in June and at Leyte Gulf
 in October. The Japanese of 1932,
 not faced with Roosevelt's
 proclaimed policy of unconditional
 surrender, rapidly thereafter sue for
 a negotiated but humbling peace.
 The tactical details are quite
 stunning in their prescience,
 considering that Bywater wrote in
 1924. He expects that ship-for-ship,
 plane-for-plane, and man-for-man the
 Japanese will be eveiy bit the equal
 of the American. He sees land and
 sea based aircraft as crucial in eveiy
 engagement, not only for scouting
 and spotting but for effective attacks
 on unarmed or lightly armed ships.
 Command of the air is an
 indispensable ingredient of victory
 and, as in World War H, his losses
 of aircraft are appalling - 50% and
 greater per engagement. Equally
 accurate and to the point, Bywater's
 ^ sea battles are swift, at relatively
 W short range, decisive, and fatal to the
 losers; he knows that the life of
 steel-hulled warships in combat is
 going to be, like Hobbes' life of
 man, "nasty, brutish and short. "
 I was first thrilled by The Great
 Pacific War as a midshipman in
 1949. When I reread the book a
 year ago, I was even more deeply
 impressed. Another man who is
 taken with Bywater and can be
 credited with resurrecting interest in
 him is William H. Honan, who
 gives us the Introduction to the
 reissue and who has written a whole
 book about his inferred influence,
 Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story
 of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater
 Devised the Plans That Led to Pearl
 Harbor, New York, St. Martin's
 Press, 1991. But Honan goes off the
 deep end, with extravagant, not to
 say absurd, conclusions that the US
 Navy changed its strategy as a result
 of Bywater's book, and Yamamoto
 "adopted Bywater's ideas as his
 own. " Honan has put two and two
 together and gotten two hundred. He
 doesn't understand that astute
 observers of the Pacific theater
 would arrive at similar conclusions
 regarding the appropriate strategy,
 operations and tactics. All that is
 required is deep research, a lot of
 data, knowledge of warships and
 tactics, hard thinking, intelligent esti-
 ma es of the enemy's choices, and
 some better-than-average capacity for
 imaginative thinking! In fact, if we
 believe Vlahos and Miller, it wasn't
 until the 1930s that our Pacific
 strategy in War Plan Orange reached
 the maturity that Bywater has
 grasped before 1925.
 What of the question I posed at
 the beginning: how much do strate-
 gists have a right to expect of the
 quality of operational plans that are
 based on war gaming and other,
 more focused tools of campaign
 analysis? It seems to me that The
 Great Pacific War should be both
 encouraging and humbling. En-
 couraging because of the power of
 Bywater's vision, of Yamamoto's,
 and of our own somewhat plodding
 p anning process. The consonance
 of the ree visions says much about
 rational minds reaching similar
 conclus ons. Remember, Yamamoto
 predicted that Japan would lose, and
 why. It was emotional, impetuous
 minds full of ego and blinded by
 hubris that led Tojo and his minions
 to take on the United States.
 Saddam Hussein should have
studied Japanese history.
 The book is also humbling, espe-
 cially to the analytical community
 because Bywater was no analyst in
 our terms, nor was he a naval
 officer, nor a statesman steeped in
 the ways of policy analysis. He was
 merely a remarkable naval
 commentator whose astute numbers
 and geography were part of the
 drama, incidental to his larger
 message. Yet in a single, carefully
 structured story, this "amateur"
 incorporates much of the best
 strategic and tactical wisdom of our
 games, indeed of the entire American
 naval planning process.
 Perhaps we military analysts
 should be compared with the
 prophets of the Old Testament. Our
 utility is not in predicting the future,
 but influencing it. Jeremiah
 described how things stood between
 his people and their God and what
 would befall if the trend persisted.
 Military analysts find strategic,
 tactical or technological holes to be
 plugged, some a small leak in the
 dike, some a yawning gap through
 which a tide of disaster will flow,
 and in our own way issue calls for
 repentance. Maybe that's why a
 traight-talking analyst is no more
 popular than a Biblical prophet. If
 Bywater was a prophet who sought
 to warn the American nation of the
 danger of the Rising Sun in the Far
 East, if he sought to warn our navy
 at Pearl Harbor and our army air
 force in the Philippines, if he sought
 to warn the Japanese that early
 success would be followed by
 ultimate failure against the sleepy-
 headed American colossus, then in
 all these things he was, unlike Eskine
 Childers, no more successful than
 Jeremiah was in warning his
 People. D
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